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Summary findings
The transformation of the planned economies of central  mortgage loans (which can be carried out more
and eastern Europe to market economies has focused on  effectively by capital market investors).
economic stabilization and liberalization, privatization,  Given the importance of real estate's share of a
and financial sector development. The housing sector  country's tangible capital, and the potential  for real
and its financial dimension, the mortgage market, have  estate collateral to secure large amounts of secured debt,
been factors in each of these processes but not always  the housing finance system should become an engine of
positive ones.  innovation for the rest of the financial sector. Moreover,
Jaffee and Renaud analyze the factors that hinder the  if the housing finance system is stunted,  other nonmarket
development of mortgage markets in these transition  devices will develop for financing and subsidizing the
economies and propose a strategy to expedite that  housing sector - creating negative externalities for the
development.  rest of the system.
They show that banks in transition economies are  But a market-based housing finance system is unlikely
reluctant to make mortgage loans because of the risks in  to emerge without initial government support, which the
mortgage lending (credit, interest rate, and liquidity  developed economies required. Moreover, the transition
risk). Together with the required  improvements in the  economies face a hurdle the developed economies did
primary market, a secondary mortgage market is likely to  not face: they must first create an economic and legal
help solve this problem. A secondary mortgage market  infrastructure to support the long-term and complex
separates the act of making mortgage loans (which can  market relationships and contracts that constitute a
still be carried out by banks) from the act of holding  housing financial system.
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The transformation  of the planned  economies  of central  and eastern  Europe  to market
economies  has focused  on three key processes:
1)  economic  stabilization  and liberalization,
2)  privatization,
3)  financial  sector development.
The housing  sector and its financial  dimension,  the mortgage  market,  have been  a factor in each
of these  processes,  although,  sad to say, not always  a positive  one.
The housing  sector  has not contributed  to economic  stabilization,  since  new housing
construction  in most transition  economies  has plummeted  since 1988,  as shown in Figure  1. Even
if we take into account  the statistical  under-reporting  problems  for private  investment  activities
in housing  rehabilitation,  it is undeniable  that the withdrawal  of the state from direct  housing
production  has led to a precipitous  fall in annual  output. The housing  sector  has also lagged  in
terms of economic  liberalization,  since  house  rents continue  to be among  the most regulated
prices  in the transition  economies. (Although  some  rent controls  appear  in many  economies,
they  take on an extreme  form in most transition  economies  as a legacy  of central  planning.)
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Housing  privatization has also been painfully slow, even when it is available to the current
occupants at virtually no cost. This may reflect, at least in part, the fear that owners will be charged
higher utility and maintenance costs than are renters. In any case, this slows down the overall
process of privatization since housing generally represents  a large part of any country's tangible
capital. In the United States, for example, residential structures (excluding land) represent almost
30% of all tangible capital and all real estate (including land) represents almost 70% of all tangible
capital (see Table 1).  These ratios may be somewhat lower for the transition economies, but not by
a large margin. This is illustrated in Figures 2 and 3 , which show the number of housing
structures per 1000 population for groups of transition and developed economies respectively.
2Table 1
U.S. Tangible Capital Assets and Debt Instruments, Year-End
1993
Tangible  Capital  Assets  $ Trillion  Percent
1  Residential  Structures  5.5  29
2  Non-Residential  Structures  3.0  16
3  Land  4.2  23
4  Total Real Estate  (1+2+3)  12.7  68
5  Total Tangible  Capital  18.7  100
Debt Instruments
6  Mortgages  4.2  34
7  U.S. Government  3.4  27
8  Corporate  Bonds  1.2  10
9  State and Local Government  1.2  10
10  Total Debt  12.4  100
Source: Flow  of Funds, Federal  Reserve  Board
In terms  offinancial sector  development,  housing  finance  has remained  in a primitive  state
compared  to the rapid  development  of banking. This is particularly  striking  because,  in most
developed  countries,  the mortgage  market--meaning  the market  for financing  real estate  assets--is
among  the largest  components  of the capital  markets. In the United  States,  for example,
mortgage  debt is the largest  component  of the domestic  debt  markets  (see Table 1).
Mortgage  market  development  is likely  to be a key factor  in overall financial  market
development.  In particular,  an efficient  mortgage  market  will act as a positive  externality  for the
other capital  markets,  creating  pressure  for higher  efficiency  in these  markets. On the other
3hand, a poorly functioning mortgage market is likely to "pollute" other financial markets with its
inefficiency.  For example, governments are likely to "support" inefficient mortgage markets
with subsidies and regulations, which then act as implicit taxes and constraints on the rest of the
capital markets.  In fact, controlling the proliferation of quasi-fiscal subsidies is a generic
problem of transition economies.
Our primary goal in this paper is to analyze the problems that are inhibiting the
development of viable housing finance systems in transition economies and to draw relevant
policy conclusions. Figure 4 shows graphically that housing finance is just one part of a much
larger program for developing sustainable financial sectors in the transition economies.  We shall
refer to other components of the financial system in our discussion of housing finance.
The rapid development of the banking sector in most transition economies raises an
immediate question, namely why the banks in the transition economies have failed to take the
lead in developing a housing finance system.  We deal with this question in Part 2, focusing on a
series of risks--credit, interest rate, and liquidity--that have constrained the ability of transition
economy banks to develop housing finance systems
The slow development of mortgage markets in transition economies indicates the need to
create a coherent housing finance strategy.  In Part 3, we first approach this topic by  evaluating
the housing finance systems used in the developed economies.  We contrast the two primary
systems that are observed--depository institutions acting as portfolio lenders and secondary
market systems.  We further analyze the alternative versions of secondary market systems.
In Part 4, we evaluate the likely efficacy for the transition economies of the alternative
systems used in developed economies. Our conclusions favor secondary mortgage markets as the
4key instrument to eliminate the constraints that have slowed the development of housing finance
systems.  Secondary markets confer two main benefits. First, banks can shed the risks associated
with holding mortgage loans by selling the loans to other investors through the secondary
market.  Second,  secondary markets create standards for credit evaluation and collateral
procedures that directly increase the efficiency of the primary markets for new mortgage
originations.  Although this paper focuses on the development of secondary mortgage markets,
fundamental changes are also required to develop the primary mortgage markets in the transition
economies (see World Bank [1995] for a discussion of primary mortgage markets in Russia).
In Part 5, we summarize our conclusions.
2.  BANKING AND HOUSING FINANCE IN TRANSITION ECONOMIES
We have seen that the rate of new housing construction in most transition economies has
plummeted since 1988. This could suggest that the failure to develop housing finance systems
has been the result of little demand for mortgage loans to finance new construction.  The same
transition economies, however, have a pent-up demand to exchange existing residential
structures, either to match housing locations with job locations or for family life-cycle reasons.
Such trading of existing structures generally creates a large demand for housing finance.
Furthermore, the low levels of new housing construction and the value of a housing asset as an
inflation hedge have raised the excess demand for housing (housing shortages), thereby creating
an excess demand for housing finance. In short, there is ample demand for housing finance in
5the transition economies.  Therefore, the source of the failure to develop housing finance systems
can be reasonably associated with supply side lenders, primarily the commercial banks.
We now consider a series of risks that are directly tied to the reluctance of banks to make
housing finance loans.  In all economies, long-term housing loans create significant credit,
interest rate, and liquidity risks for bank management.  In the transition economies, volatile
inflation and the political pressures to control interest rates have expanded these risks even
further. The financial instruments and markets that are used to manage these risks in the
developed economies are just now beginning to function properly in the group of advanced
reformers. The lack of credit evaluation skills and inadequate capital are other constraints to
mortgage lending that are only slowly being resolved. We now look at these factors individually.
Figure 3: Housing Stock in Developed Countries, 1990
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2.1  Credit Risk
In developed mortgage markets, credit risk--that is, the risk of default--on a real estate
loan is usually measured by two ratios, with a lower value of either ratio indicating less credit
risk:
*  The loan to value ratio is the ratio of the loan amount to the property value.
a  The payment to income ratio is the ratio of the annual mortgage payment (including
payments for insurance, property taxes, and the like) to the borrower's annual income.
Loan to Value Ratios
The loan to value ratio is generally considered the more basic determinant of credit risk
because, as long as the loan amount is less than the property value, the lender can always recover
the loan principal by taking over the property and selling it. In transition economies, however,
this is unlikely to be the case for two reasons.  First, the property rights and foreclosure
procedures that are needed for real estate to function as loan collateral are not well established in
7the legal and institutional structures of the transition economies.  Second, accurate methods for
estimating property values in transition economies are just now being developed, and this is
made even more difficult by the inflationary conditions in many of these countries.
Real Estate Property Rights
In most transition economies, property laws had to be rewritten to recreate the concept of
real estate.  Privately managing the bundle of land and building rights that constitute real estate
property in a market economy is still a new way of operating.  The requirements of residential
and business real estate development often remain poorly understood or accepted by central and
city administrations.  In Russia, in particular, it is proving politically very difficult to develop the
concept of private land ownership and to accept the trading of land and the emergence of land
markets.  '  The privatization of the housing stock is also incomplete. Apartments units can be
privatized, but in the absence of condominium laws and the creation of condominium
associations, the financing and maintenance by residents of the public space and the networks
within the buildings is inadequate. Another frequent problem was, and still is, that land property
boundaries were not drawn up and recorded at the time of construction under the state system.
They now need to be defined and accepted by parties often suspicious of each other.
Secured Lending and Real Estate
In all transition economies, the weak environment for secured lending affects all types of
loans, including loans to small and medium sized enterprises.  Loans secured by real estate
lending suffer especially from the legacy of poor land titling.  Even in countries with a tradition
See  Bertaud  and  Renaud  [1994].
8of high quality registration, like east Germany, "land books" were no longer properly maintained
during the socialist era. Stable and sound land use systems are emerging in a painfully slow way
from the legacy of the state urban planning.  Old urban plans and old urban cadres constrain the
entire property sector and therefore all forms of physical investment. Incomplete and untested
collateral and foreclosures laws create large credit risks for lenders. Alternative forms of
collateral lending that differ from the usual Western foreclosure practices may therefore be
useful.
Payment to Income Ratios
In the absence of  real estate as a source of dependable collateral, payment to income
ratios become a more critical determinant of credit risk.  In the transition economies, however,
the payment to income ratio is also unlikely to provide lenders with dependable protection
against loan default.  The primary problem is that average income to property value ratios tend to
be an order of magnitude lower in the transition economies. Specifically, in most developed
economies, the average income to property value ratio ranges from about 1/4 to 1/3, while in
most transition economies the same ratio tends to be 1/10 or lower.  Although this is likely to be
temporary, since it is primarily the result of highly depressed income levels in the transition
economies, it makes housing loans in the transition economies extremely risky in the early years
of reform. Furthermore, the difficulty of verifying income--due to significant underground
economic activity and the absence of credit bureaus--increases credit risks and leads to credit
rationing on the part of the banks that cannot properly address that particular information
asymmetry.
92.2  Interest Rate Risk
In developed economies, housing finance lenders are sometimes short funded, meaning
that the maturity (or duration) of their mortgage assets exceeds the maturity of their funding
sources (such as bank deposits).  This occurs because mortgage borrowers generally wish to
match their durable housing assets with long-term mortgage loans, while depositors prefer the
liquidity of short-term investments.  The short funding creates an interest rate risk for the lenders,
since an increase in market interest rates raises the cost of deposits without immediately raising
the return on the mortgage assets. The interest rate risk can be hedged using capital market
instruments, but they have a high cost, approximately equal to the difference between short-term
and long- term interest rates. Alternatively, the interest rate risk can be controlled by using
adjustable-rate or floating-rate mortgages, but these instruments only displace the interest rate
risk to the borrower.
In the transition economies, capital market instruments are unlikely to be available to
hedge the interest rate risk, so floating-rate mortgages will be the norm.  This means that
borrowers face the interest rate risk, which increases their likelihood of loan default.  In other
words, floating-rate mortgages tend to transform the banks' interest rate risk into credit risk, not
necessarily a significant improvement.  Furthermore, real interest rates (nominal interest rates
minus the expected inflation rates) have been high (often in excess of 15%) and volatile in the
transition economies,  further raising the credit risk on adjustable-rate mortgages.
In fact, price-level indexed mortgages, which contractually set a fixed real interest rate for
the mortgage, offer a potentially better solution for controlling both interest rate and credit risk in
10the transition economies.  There are also hybrid instruments, such as the dual interest rate
mortgage (DIM) used in Mexico, which create variable, real-rate, mortgages. However, these
mortgages remain relatively complex instruments, and therefore are likely to be difficult to
introduce in an otherwise under-developed housing finance system.
2.3  Liquidity Risk
The depositors in transition economies are likely to value liquidity--meaning the ability to
convert deposits rapidly to cash--reflecting the high risks associated with the macroeconomy,
individual banks, and the consumer's individual needs for funds. The banks must therefore
anticipate large and unexpected deposit outflows, which require that assets be rapidly sold to
finance the deposit outflows.  Government securities are good assets for this purpose, since they
trade in active and liquid markets and their prices are accurately determnined. Business loans are
more difficult to sell, but their short-term maturities make them essentially self-liquidating.
Mortgages do not have short-term maturities and they do not easily trade in secondary markets
(because buyers find it costly to verify the credit quality of each mortgage offered for sale).
Taking these factors together, mortgages create significant liquidity risks for lenders.
3.  EFFICIENT MORTGAGE MARKETS IN DEVELOPED  ECONOMIES
Efficient mortgage markets require that the lending risks--credit, interest-rate, and
liquidity--be allocated to the long-term investors who are best able to handle them.  Many
alternative systems have been used, reflecting different economic conditions and attitudes toward
risk.  For example, the late 19th century saw the development of what we call the  mortgage
11credit institute (MCI), created throughout Europe and most common in Northern Europe. 2  The
structure of these banks reflected the tradeoff between credit risk on one hand and interest rate
and liquidity risk on the other hand.  Its German version (the Hypothenken Bank), for example,
minimized credit risk by making mortgage loans with loan to value ratios below 60%.  Although
this reduced the credit risk faced by the bank, it forced the borrowers to delay their first home
purchase until they had accumulated the substantial equity required for the downpayment.
In the United States and England, until recently, most home loans have been made by
depository institutions, including commercial banks, Savings and Loan Associations in the
United States, and Building Societies in England. How the various risks are shared between the
lender and borrower then depends on the particular form of the mortgage instrument.  For
example, in the United States during the Great Depression of the 1930s, many borrowers suffered
the unexpected loss of their homes when lenders suddenly stopped renewing short-term mortgage
loans. On the other hand,  in the United States during the early 1980s, the Savings and Loan
Associations (S&Ls) suffered massive losses and many of the institutions ultimately failed when
interest rates rose unexpectedly while the institutions were following a short funding strategy
using fixed-rate mortgages.
A key advantage of the depository institution system is that three distinct mortgage
market functions can be vertically integrated within the depository institution:
Mortgage origination is the process through which mortgage debt is created,
comparable to the underwriting function for other capital market securities.3
2  See  European  Mortgage  Federation  [1990]  for further  background.  The MCIs  made mortgage  loans to various
borrowers  including  households,  commercial  enterprises,  and local  governments.
12Mortgage hoding  refers to the activity of institutions and other investors who own or
hold mortgage debt. When the mortgage originator and the mortgage holder differ, it is
necessary to transf  mortgage ownership.  The high risk, high information costs, and
small size of individual mortgages complicate the mortgage transfer process.
Mortgage servicing refers to a series of activities, including (1) collecting the monthly
payments from the borrowers and transmitting the funds to the holders, (2) confirming
that the borrower maintains property insurance and pays property taxes, and (3)
carrying out the foreclosure process in cases of default.
The last 30 years, however, have seen a trend toward separating or unbundling these
mortgage market functions.  The new developments can be described as secondary market
systems, in which mortgages are originated by one agent (a depository institution or specialized
mortgage originator), but are then transferred to a capital market institution or other investor who
serves as the final holder. In many European countries, the final holder is a mortgage crei
institution, which issues its own debt. In the United States, there are two government sponsored
agencies--Federal National Mortgage Association (FNMA, or Fannie Mae) and Federal Home
Loan Mortgage Corporation (FHLMC, or Freddie Mac)--which purchase mortgages directly
from originators.  Another government agency, the Federal Home Loan Banks, lends funds to
mortgage originators.
3Strictly  speaking,  real estate loans generally  consist  of two  documents:  the bed  (or note)  which  documents  the
terms of loan repayment;  and the mortgage  which  provides  the collateral. We will follow  common  usage,
however, in using  the term "mortgage"  to refer to both sets of loan documents.
133.1  Criteria for Evaluating Efficient Mortgage Market Systems
The most basic indicator for evaluating alternative structures is the borrower's  "all-in"
cost.  The all-in borrowing cost incorporates both the direct interest rate and the costs associated
with the non-price terms of the mortgage instrument such as maturity, floating interest rates,
downpayment requirements, and credit availability.  In principle, each of the three mortgage
functions--origination, holding, and servicing--can have an independent impact on the borrowing
cost.  In practice, however, the holding function is the primary economic factor, since the
mortgage holder can then choose the most efficient institutions for administering the mortgage
origination and servicing activities.
The all-in borrowing cost also includes the government's cost of guaranteeing or
otherwise administering the housing finance system. For example, under the depository
institution system, some of the government's costs associated with safeguarding deposits should
be included in the all-in costs of the housing finance system.  Under a secondary market system,
the same is true for the government's cost of providing credit guarantees on mortgage
instruments and/or the liabilities of the mortgage holding institutions. The government may try,
of course, to deny responsibility for the housing finance system's credit risks, but this is rarely
successful.
We now apply the all-in borrowing cost criteria to alternative mortgage systems. 4
4  For further discussion see Diamond and Lea (1992a] and [1992b].
143.2  Depository "Portfolio Lenders"
Depository institutions acting as portfolio lenders have three key advantages as the
central source of funds for mortgage lending. First, the interest rates on deposits tend to be
among the lowest in an economy, reflecting the "retail" nature of this source of funds.  Second,
by integrating all the mortgage functions--origination, holding, and servicing--in a single
institution, the depository system avoids the costs of transferring mortgages to other holders, an
efficiency of vertical integration.  Third, retail lenders may have informational advantages in
extending credit to households who are also customers for other banking services.
Factors Raising the All-In Costs of Depository Lenders
A closer examination of these advantages of the depository system reveals, however, that
they may be more apparent than real.  First, the all-in cost of retail deposits must include the
costs of hedging the interest rate risks that result from a short funding strategy. 5 The all-in cost of
retail deposits should also include the institutions' costs of satisfying required capital ratios and
other supervisory standards, and the government's cost of insuring retail deposits.
Second, the economies of scale in mortgage origination and servicing created by recent
technological innovations in computers, communications, and information retrieval appear now
to dominate the economies of vertical integration that underlie the depository system.  This
change is evident in the innovative unbundling of mortgage functions and activities occurring in
many  developed countries.
5Alternatively,  institutions  may try to profit from a short  funding  strategy,  but they then bear the risk of an
occasional  disaster.
15Third, depository lenders often find it more profitable to apply their credit evaluation
expertise to business and consumer loans than to mortgage loans.  This occurs because the more
complex nature of the credit risk on business and consumer loans allows the institutions to create
greater value added.  In addition, the maturity of most business and consumer loans is quite
short-term, so these loans do not entail the maturity mismatch discussed above for mortgages.
Specialized Depository Lenders
The high all-in costs of mortgage lending by depository intermediaries often makes the
activity unprofitable, which is the basic reason why banks often do not participate in housing
finance.  To deal with this, governments were often tempted to create a specialized depository
group dedicated to mortgage lending.  The Savings and Loan Associations (S&Ls) in the United
States and the Building Societies in England are examples of this approach. To maintain their
special status, these institutions were required to maintain the greater part of their assets in home
mortgages.  In exchange, they received tax benefits and lower capital requirements.  They were
also allowed to follow a short funding strategy.
Specialized lenders, however, often create as many problems as they solve.  In particular,
since they are not well diversified across asset categories and are likely to follow a short funding
strategy, they tend to be fragile with respect to changes in the economic environment.
Specialized institutions also tend to avoid competition and to lag in introducing new
technologies. In the United States, for example, the sharp increase in interest rates during the
early 1  980s created large losses for these S&Ls, resulting in large-scale failures.  Currently,
regulations are being developed to transform the remaining S&Ls into commercial banks,
16thereby eliminating this class of specialized lenders. Comparable changes are now occurring in
the British Building Societies.
Conclusions Regarding Commercial Banks as Housing Finance Lenders
The private commercial banks in transition economies are a natural starting point to
initiate a housing finance system, based on their low-cost deposits, expertise in lending, and
access to retail customers.6 In practice, however, there has been very little mortgage lending by
transition economy banks, because the activity is not profitable once the all-in costs are
considered.  Governments could revert to a subsidized set of specialized depository lenders, but
the experience in developed economies suggests this is likely to be expensive and inefficient.
3.3  Secondary  Mortgage Market  (SMM) Systems
We have seen that the mortgage holding function is the strategic focus for dealing with
the risks of mortgage lending.  We now consider secondary mortgage markets (SMMs) as a
solution for handling risk in the housing finance system.  The basic principle of a SMM is to tap
capital market investors as the long-term funding source for the mortgage market, thus mitigating
interest rate and credit risk.  Mortgages are first originated by depository institutions or other
mortgage bankers7 who are expected to have expertise in risk evaluation and underwriting new
mortgage loans.  The mortgages are then sold to the final investors who hold the mortgages.
6  Most  transition  economies  have also  inherited  a set of savings  banks  from their socialist  era. These  banks dealt
exclusively  with  the household  sector,  and  developed  little  skill in credit  evaluation.
7  The term mortgage  banker  is used here  to refer to institutions  which  specialize  in originating  new mortgages. It
should not be confused with mortgage credit banks, which specialize in holding mortgages purchased from
mortgage bankers.
17There are various forms for SMM systems, based on differences in the instruments used for the
mortgage sale and in the type of investors or institutions who buy the mortgages.
The Problems of Selling Existing Mortgages
The SMM buyer of existing mortgages faces asymmetric information in that the mortgage
seller is likely to have much better information regarding the credit risk of the underlying
mortgages than does the buyer.  This creates the moral hazard risk that the seller may claim that
the mortgages are of high quality, whereas in fact they are of low quality.  Furthermore, the low
quality of the mortgages may not be revealed until several years later when higher than expected
default rates begin to occur. At that time, it may also be difficult to determine whether the high
default rates result from low quality mortgages or simply bad luck (high default rates on high
8 quality mortgages) . As a result, most buyers of mortgages impose conditions or otherwise take
actions to control these effects of asymmetric information.
One solution, for example, is for the buyer to evaluate the quality of the mortgages with
the same level of diligence carried out by the mortgage originator (i.e. the mortgage seller),
thereby eliminating the informational asymmetry. 9 This process, however, is cumbersome and
costly, since individual mortgages are of small size relative to investor portfolios and each
mortgage must be evaluated.  As a result, mortgage sales are rarely based on a re-evaluation of
the individual mortgages.  Instead, asymmetric information is controlled through a number of
a  The fact that "seasoned" (long outstanding) mortgages have a lower default rate is observed in all existing
mortgage systems.
9  This is exactly the method used by many venture capitalists and investment bankers when evaluating investments
in new start-up companies.
18devices, including underwriting standards, reputation of the seller, and credit guarantees.  These
are now briefly described.
Underwriting Standards.  The SMM buyer can specify that the mortgages meet certain
underwriting standards, such as maximum values for the loan to value ratio or income to
payment ratio. Of course, reporting problems still make underwriting standards an imperfect
solution to the asymmetric information problem. Nevertheless, in the case of unexpectedly high
default rates, the buyer may be able to claim restitution by documenting a violation of the agreed
upon standards.
Reputation.  In practice, most SMM buyers "prequalify" mortgage originators from whom they
expect to purchase mortgages. If a SMM seller anticipates many transactions with a buyer, then
the seller may not take advantage of his superior information in order to protect his reputation.
The reliance on reputation is most effective for buyers with a dominant market position, since the
sellers will anticipate future transactions and attempt to maintain a high reputation.
Credit Guarantees. The buyer may require that there be guarantees on the mortgages sold.  When
the SMM seller has a high credit rating, it can provide the credit guarantee directly. Often,
however, the credit rating of the SMM seller will not be that high, and it will have to rely on
external guarantees from third-parties, including the government.  Such third party guarantees
may apply either to the selling institution or to the individual mortgages.
Purchases by Mortgage Credit Institutions
In many developed countries, the SMM is dominated by large institutions which
specialize in either purchasing mortgages or in lending funds to the institutions that hold the
mortgages.  Examples include the Federal National Mortgage Association (FNMA) in the United
States and the Stadshypothek in Sweden. Bond issues in the capital markets are the principal
funding source for the institutions.  The large size of these institutions allows them to set
underwriting standards and to rely on the sellers' reputations. The large scale of their bond
issues and their continuing presence in the capital markets also provides liquidity benefits that
result in lower interest rates. The interest rates paid by these institutions are generally very close
to the rates on government securities of the same maturity, reflecting little or no risk premium,
19either because the MCI has successfully insulated itself from mortgage credit risks that remain
with primary lenders and provides good credit enhancements, or more often because investors
treat the bonds as if they had an implicit government guarantee.  The basis for this belief is
either that the government would not allow a primary component of the mortgage market to fail
and/or that the institution is too large a component of the overall financial markets to be allowed
to fail.
The FNMA institution of the United States provides a useful case study for how such
institutions are created and the role they play in the mortgage market.  FNMA was started as a
government agency to create a secondary mortgage market, meaning that it was to provide
liquidity by standing ready to buy and sell mortgages.  In practice, FNMA primarily bought
mortgages, accumulating a large and profitable portfolio (given its low cost of borrowing).  At a
later date, FNMA was reorganized as a stockholder-owned corporation, although the government
retained some control.  Most recently, FNMA has served ,in addition, as a conduit for
securitized mortgages (see discussion below).  Another secondary market institution, the Federal
Home Loan Mortgage Corporation (commonly called Freddie Mac), operates in a very similar
fashion.  The government imposes capital ratios on both institutions, although the requirements
are approximately one-half those imposed on commercial banks.  The two institutions dominate
those parts of the mortgage market in which they are allowed to operate.
A recent paper by Hermalin and Jaffee [1996] evaluates the implicit U.S. government
guarantee of FNMA and Freddie Mac (F&F) debt and carries out a welfare analysis of the effects
of removing the guarantee. The evidence suggests that the implicit government guarantee creates
an interest cost saving on the order of 50 basis points, which appears to be shared between F&F
20shareholders and the country's mortgage borrowers.  The country's taxpayers, however, bear the
cost of the F&F subsidy, in the form of  incrementally higher government borrowing costs and
the potential costs of a F&F bailout.  Overall, Hermalin and Jaffee conclude that a removal of the
implicit government guarantee would be welfare enhancing, although it remains an open
question whether the government could credibly shed its implicit guarantee given the importance
of F&F in both the mortgage market and the overall capital markets.  ' 0
Loans by Mortgage Credit Institutions (MCIs)
MCIs can also support the mortgage market by lending funds to depository institutions
who then hold the mortgages. The Federal Home Loan Banks (FHLBs) in the United States  and
the Caisse de Refinancement Hypothecaire (CRH) in France operate in exactly this manner.
Under this system, the MCI bears the risk of bankruptcy of the institution to which it makes the
loans, but bears no direct risk with regard to the mortgages held by the institution.  In practice,
however, the MCI will generally hold mortgages of the borrowing institution as collateral to back
its loans, so that the MCI will suffer losses only as a result of the default risk on the mortgages
held as collateral. The overall effect on the mortgage market are likely to be very similar whether
the MCIs buy the mortgages or advances loans to another institution to hold the mortgages,
although the precise form of the risk borne by the MCI is potentially different.
'°  An alternative to removing the government guarantee would be to assess a fee for it.  Such a fee would remove
market distortions -- provided its rate is correctly assessed which may be an uncertain outcome given the political
processes involved.
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Mortgage securitization, a third form for the SMM, has developed very rapidly in the
United States and is used occasionally in Europe. The process begins with the MCI purchasing
mortgages from an originator in the same manner described above. The purchased mortgages are
then combined to form a mortgage pool and prorated shares in the cash flow of the mortgage
pool are sold to investors as mortgage securities.  The mortgage pool and the mortgage securities
are thus directly linked, and neither appears on the balance sheet of the MCI.
In the traditional mortgage purchase model described above, in contrast, the purchased
mortgages and the issued bonds both appear on the MCI's balance sheet.  This difference is less
important than it may appear, however, since under the securitization system the MCI continues
to guarantee the mortgage securities against losses created by defaults on the underlying
mortgages.  A more important difference is that unexpected timing variations in the cash flow
from the mortgage pool, created by early repayments on the mortgages, are passed through to the
mortgage security investors, whereas they are not when the MCI issues regular bonds.  A more
detailed discussion of mortgage securitization is provided in Jaffee and Renaud [1995]. We shall
not discuss mortgage securitization further in this paper, because the refinements offered by
mortgage securitization are unlikely to be relevant in the context of the transition economies.
4.  SECONDARY MORTGAGE MARKETS IN TRANSITION ECONOMIES
SMMs can aid the development of a housing finance system in a transition economy by
removing the risks of holding mortgages from the commercial banks or others who originate the
mortgages.  In this section, we discuss the principles that should be applied in organizing the
22SMM and the issues that are likely to arise in the process.  We take as the basic format a single
mortgage credit institution (MCI) that will purchase mortgages from the institutions originating
the mortgages, although we will also discuss alternative frameworks.  The funding source of the
MCI would be bonds of various maturities issued in the capital markets.
4.1  The Essential Role for Government in Organizing a Secondary Mortgage Market
The question can be asked, if a SMM helps create an efficient housing finance system,
then why do the private commercial banks not create the MCI themselves. The short answer is
that the MCI must have a high enough credit rating to issue bonds in the capital markets, and B
rated commercial banks basically cannot create A rated MCIs. Furthermore, the MCI requires
stature and size to set standards for the entire mortgage market, and it is hard for private market
institutions to cooperate in order to cover the large initial costs required to set up such an
institution.  In particular, a fully private MCI would likely be initially too small to achieve the
liquidity benefits that arise from issuing large amounts of securities on a continuing basis.
A well functioning mortgage market, however, provides enormous external benefits to
the economy, including capital market development, increased labor market mobility,
construction sector employment, and the efficient allocation of real estate assets. Initial
government support of the SMM is therefore likely to be both essential and beneficial, which is
why governments have always helped to create the MCIs in the developed economies.  At the
same time, the experience gained in creating SMMs in the developed economies can be usefully
applied by the new transition economies.
234.2  The Form of Government Support for a Secondary Mortgage Market
We now analyze some specific principles that can help guide a government toward
providing efficient support of the SMM.  We assume that the SMM takes the form of a MCI
which issues debt in the capital markets and uses its funds to purchase mortgages from the
private market institutions that originate them.  In the initial stages, the government should share
ownership with private market participants, with each side contributing to the MCI's  equity
capital.  International organizations, such as the International Finance Corporation (the private
sector arm of the World Bank Group) might also contribute equity capital to the MCI.  This has
the further advantage that such international organizations would also contribute expertise and
management experience.
Government Guarantees of Mortgage Credit Institute Debt
The government's primary role in the secondary mortgage market is to guarantee the
bonds issued by the MCI. This guarantee should be explicit. It is inefficient to use implicit
guarantees because the government remains obligated, but the MCI does not receive the full
benefit."  Furthermore, the government should charge the MCI a user  fee, to defray the cost of
the guarantee.  This makes the amount of the subsidy transparent, and also provides an incentive
for the MCI to eliminate the guarantee at a later date when it can generate a high credit rating
based on its own assets and management skills.  At the same time, if the government chooses to
introduce other direct subsidies for housing construction or home purchase, these should be
handled within the government budget or with special donor programs, not through the SMM.
1lThe  gap between the benefits of the guarantee to the MCI and its potential cost to the government results from
the uncertainty regarding the exact conditions under which this guarantee would actually be exercised.
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The goal is to create an effective housing finance system, not to support any specific class
of lenders or borrowers.12 Therefore, access to the SMM should be available to all lenders and
borrowers who are able to offer properly underwritten mortgage instruments for sale.  In this
way, those private sector institutions that are most efficient in making mortgage loans and using
the SMM would be encouraged to do so, without the need for any central agency to prejudge
which specific institutions will participate.  This criterion seems particularly important given
that most transition economies are adopting universal (or rather full  service) banking systems, in
which competition and efficiency will determine which individual banks choose to specialize in
each form of lending.
Government Regulation, But Not Government Management
In the transition economies, as in the developed economies, government is unlikely to
manage financial institutions efficiently. Therefore, even if the ownership of the MCI is shared
between the government and private banks, the banks should be the managers. 3
The government, of course, should maintain an important supervisory role, reflecting its
stake in the guarantees it provides on mortgages and the institutions operating in the  SMM. In
particular, it should set regulations specifying the type of mortgage assets purchased and bond
liabilities issued by the MCI.  Furthermore, it should specify required capital ratios and related
supervisory standards for the MCI on a basis comparable to its commercial bank requirements.14
12  Government on-budget fiscal subsidies should be used if certain social groups are deemed to require special help.
13  In other words, the agency cost of mixing private management with government ownership is likely to be less
than the cost of inefficient government management.
25Competition, Privatization. and Sunset Provisions
As the housing finance system develops, the MCI is likely, sooner or later, to become
quite profitable.  It is therefore worthwhile to anticipate, even from the beginning, how the
system should evolve.  For one thing, as soon as it becomes practical, charters should be
provided for the entry of additional and competitive MCIs.  Otherwise, a single MCI will use its
monopoly power to maximize profits, to the detriment of the housing finance system.  For
another thing, procedures should be established to allow the private owners of the MCI to
purchase the government's share, leading eventually to a fully privatized institution.  This
principle was used in the United States, for example, to organize the Federal Home Loan Bank
System. To remove any ambiguity whether privatization will occur, it can be useful to set a
sunset date, by which the government's participation must be fully eliminated. As an example,
the French government provided guarantees on the MCI securities for only 4 years when it
created a privately owned SMM institution.
Public Policy in Support of Primary Lenders
Although our discussion has focused on secondary mortgage markets as a mechanism to
allocate the risks of mortgage holding, a well functioning mortgage market also requires an
efficient system for mortgage originations in the primary market.  The  institutions to carry out
the primary mortgage functions are likely to arise naturally once the secondary market is
established.  However, the government must first take on the responsibility to create the legal and
financial infrastructure-- real estate property rights, foreclosure procedures, and secured lending
14  For this reason, the agency to supervise the MCIs should be the same agency that supervises the commercial
banks, which, in most cases, will be the country's central bank.
26laws--that are the necessary first step for the development of any meaningful mortgage market
activity.
5.  CONCLUSIONS
A housing finance system is an essential component of the development of an efficient
financial system in a transition economy.  Given the importance of real estate's a share of all the
tangible capital in a country, and the potential for real estate collateral to secure large mounts of
secured debt, the housing finance system should become an engine of innovation for the rest of
the financial sector.  On the other hand, if the housing finance system is stunted, then other non-
market devices will develop for financing and subsidizing the housing sector, creating negative
externalities for the rest of the financial system.
A housing finance system, however, is unlikely to spring up without govermnent support,
whatever one's faith in the dexterity of Adam Smith's  invisible hand.  Govermment  support was
required in the developed economies, and it is required now in the transition economies.  In fact,
the transition economies face the additional major hurdle that they must first create an economic
and legal infrastructure that can support the long-tenn and complex market relationships and
contracts that constitute a housing financial system.
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We have seen in Figure 4 that the creation of a housing finance system is an integral
component of the overall development of the financial sector. We also noted in the introduction
that the transformation of the previously planned economies should focus on three key processes:
(1) economic stabilization and liberalization, (2) privatization, and (3) financial sector
development. The development of a housing finance system should reflect this sequencing, since
a mortgage market can be included as a core component in step (3) only after meaningful
progress has first occurred in steps (1) and (2).
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